One of the many things that makes (egel s thought so intriguing is deciding where to place him in the dispute between the ancients and the moderns a polarity which he himself played a large part in popularizing. This is because on the one hand, Hegel often goes out of his way to emphasize the comparative richness and attractiveness of classical thought, as against the superficial and reductive outlook of the moderns; on the other hand, he is in no doubt about the historical significance of the modern world, and how in many ways the ancient world had to be surpassed. As Hegel puts it with characteristic ambivalence in Pippin unless this is made central to our reading of (egel s thought we will be lost and where this approach applies to both (egel s theoretical and practical philosophy.
More to the general and more obvious point, however, much of the standard view of how Hegel passes beyond Kant into speculative philosophy makes very puzzling, to the point of unintelligibility, how Hegel could have been the post-Kantian philosopher he understood himself to be that is how he could have accepted as he did Kant s revelations about the fundamental inadequacies of the metaphysical tradition, could have enthusiastically agreed with Kant that the metaphysics of the beyond , of substance, and of traditional views of God and infinity were forever discredited, and then could have promptly created a systematic metaphysics as if he has never heard of Kant s critical epistemology. Just attributing moderate philosophic intelligence to Hegel should at least make one hesitate before construing him as a post-Kantian philosopher with a precritical metaphysics. (Pippin 1989: 7) Following this Principle Pippin himself developed a Kantian reading of (egel s idealism, which while of course it goes beyond Kant in significant respects, still has a recognizably transcendental flavour a flavour that has not endeared
Pippin s reading to all tastes
Similarly, in Pippin s treatment of (egel s practical philosophy he has underlined (egel s commitment to a Kantian notion of freedom as selflegislation, notwithstanding their other well-known differences. For Pippin, this goes along with a characteristically modern move away from nature and thus from any sort of Aristotelian naturalism in ethics; the puzzles that arise for Kantian self-legislation are answered by (egel s turn to history, and the move from the ) to the we . So for Pippin, again, while Hegel undoubtedly drew something from the Greeks, his outlook is fundamentally a modern one, and highly indebted to Kant, despite their less significant divergences.
Others, however, have put the emphasis in a different place in their reading of Hegel, seeking to push the balance more in favour of the Greeks than Pippin seems inclined to do, whether this is Plato, Neo-Platonism or Aristotle, or some combination of the three. In theoretical philosophy, this has led to more Platonic or Aristotelian readings of the Logic in particular, which treat it less as a transcendental inquiry into our conceptual scheme 1 and more as an ontological inquiry into the fundamental structure of being qua being. Of course, those emphasizing the ancient over the modern in this way must pay due attention to the corresponding role of the modern in (egel s thought. They too must respect Pippin s Principle to this extent; but they will claim to do so without needing to take as much of the transcendental turn as Pippin himself appears to think is necessary if the Principle is to be respected. I have argued elsewhere that this can perhaps be achieved. 2 )n this paper however ) do not want to discuss (egel s theoretical philosophy from this perspective, but his practical philosophy. For, the same debate concerning ancient vs modern comes up here, where once again we find Pippin on the side of the moderns. Thus, those who take the other side must face an equivalent of Pippin s Principle in this arena too: just as Pippin thinks attributing moderate philosophical intelligence to Hegel in theoretical philosophy means we must see him as taking the transcendental critique of metaphysics seriously, so he thinks attributing such intelligence to Hegel in practical philosophy means we must see him as taking Kant s self-legislation thesis seriously, in a way that makes a fundamental break with anything resembling Aristotelian ethics )t is this application of Pippin s Principle that )
wish to explore where ultimately ) will argue it misses the way that (egel s ethics remains in the Aristotelian perfectionist tradition, albeit a perfectionism of a significantly post-Kantian form. structure of the will of the rational agent, and is thus of a distinctively postKantian kind.
Perfectionism
To a surprisingly large extent perfectionism remains the great unknown of ethics. On the one hand, virtually all the great ethicists can be viewed as perfectionists in some broad sense that is, as making some conception of the flourishing life for human beings, the realization of our fundamental capacities or natures, central to their ethics and social philosophy. What distinguishes them is their different accounts of what that flourishing consists in. Taken in this way, at least the following could be put on this list without raising great controversy:
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Rousseau, Marx, Nietzsche, Mill, Bradley, Green, and Dewey. The question I want to concentrate on here, which equally raises the question above concerning (egel s place between the ancients and the moderns, is whether Hegel should be included as part of this tradition. I will do so by focusing on a recent dispute between McDowell and Pippin.
Roughly speaking, the terms of the dispute are as follows. In some of his earlier papers on Aristotle, McDowell questions the way in which Aristotle should be considered to be a naturalist. Pippin takes that to show that nature has no place in ethics, thus cutting the ground out from under any perfectionist approach but, he argues, McDowell fails to see this fully. Pippin thinks Hegel shows a more consistent repudiation of naturalism in his ethics, given the priority he gives to spirit over nature , which requires a shift towards Kantian self-legislation instead. On this account, norms are not to be derived from what is required for the proper realization of our nature qua human beings, but from the form of practical reason, to which Hegel then gives a historicist turn. I will argue, however that looking at (egel s Logic suggests that Pippin may be too quick to reject the Aristotelian aspect of (egel s ethics so that while (like McDowell) Hegel may be taken as rejecting certain ways in which perfectionism might be developed, Pippin goes too far in claiming that he wanted to reject it altogether in favour of a more thoroughgoing Kantian position. As a result, I will argue, Hegel can legitimately be placed in the perfectionist canon after all.
In order to explain what I mean here by perfectionism, naturalism and selfrealization, it is helpful to start with a passage from Terence Irwin:
[Aristotle] defends an account of the human good as happiness (eudaimonia), consisting in the fulfilment of human nature, expressed in the various human virtues. His position is teleological, in so far as it seeks the best guide for action in an ultimate end, eudaimonist, in so far as it identifies the ultimate end with happiness, and naturalist, in so far as it identifies virtue and happiness in a life that fulfils the nature and capacities of rational human nature. (Irwin 2007: 4) 3 So, according to the Aristotelian eudaemonist, the human good consists in happiness; human happiness consists in the fulfilment or realization of human nature; and human nature can be defined in terms of what capacities are essential to human beings, qua members of a natural kind. Thus, the good of a human being is that which promotes the species nature of the individual qua human being and their distinctive capacities, where virtuous action by individual will lead to their good/flourishing, by developing capacities in this way. So, we can take what it is that leads to human happiness, understood as the realization of human capacities, as a guide to action and thus as determining its norms and the character of the virtues. Now, while a position of this sort can be called eudaimonist, it can also be called perfectionist, because it takes happiness to consist in the proper development of our distinctive capacities, rather than simply pleasure or desiresatisfaction. On the other hand, it may be distinguished from a narrower form of perfectionism, which takes this development to be a good in itself, rather than as an aspect of the well-being of the individual. Perfectionism in both these forms involves a picture of the proper development of our capacities as the kinds of creatures we are, and builds normativity out of that which is what makes it a kind of naturalism. So the fundamental question is: can the appeal to nature do this kind of work, when it comes to human beings? 3 )rwin s three volume work )rwin is a masterful historical study of the Aristotelian naturalist tradition in the context of the development of ethics. For a classic systematic study, see Hurka 1993. This is the issue at the centre of the dispute between McDowell and Pippin that I want to look at further, as it relates to Hegel.
McDowell on Aristotle
The key paper that forms the basis for the dispute is McDowell s classic text Two Sorts of Naturalism which draws out different ways in which Aristotle s naturalism might be understood. One way might be to see Aristotle as trying to use his naturalism to convince people to be virtuous, as a way in which they might then flourish, and thus as a way of making their lives go well given their natures. But, McDowell argues (following others such as Bradley and Prichard), 4 this would be a mistake, for the reason why a virtuous agent would act nobly (for example) is that that action is noble; for any further reason related to flourishing to come into play would just detract from that, and give the virtuous person the wrong reasons to act ethically, based on their interests.
Having made that fairly familiar point, McDowell adds a further argument more relevant to the later dispute with Pippin, namely that for us qua rational agents, appeals to what is natural to us and thus might enable us to flourish as natural beings can cut no ice anyway so the approach is doomed from the start.
McDowell illustrates the problem here with the idea of a rational wolf , where a rational wolf would be able to let his mind roam over possibilities of behaviour other than what comes naturally to wolves where this reflects a deep connection between reason and freedom; we cannot make sense of a creature s acquiring reason unless it has genuinely alternative possibilities of action, over which its thought can play (McDowell 1996: 170) .
McDowell then considers how this rational wolf might respond faced with some behaviour that he sees comes naturally to wolves, such as hunting cooperatively in a pack: because he is a rational wolf, he can step back and ask of that behaviour why should ) do this . Once the question has arisen, McDowell asks how can it help to appeal to what wolves need :
Why should ) pull my weight , says our reflective wolf, wondering whether to idle through the hunt but still grab his share of the prey.
Suppose we respond truly enough Wolves need to pool their energies, if their style of hunting is to be effective If our wolf has stepped back from his natural impulse and taken up the critical stance, why should what we say impress him? (McDowell 1996: 171) What is the problem here? The difficulty is that while wolves in general, as a kind, may need to work co-operatively as a pack in a way that makes it best for them as a kind this doesn t necessarily make it best for the individual wolf who (as a rational wolf) is able to distinguish between the two (McDowell 1996: 172) . Aristotelian naturalism in this first sense, as a response to a why be moral question is therefore rejected.
McDowell then diagnoses why we (but not Aristotle) might feel the pull of such a grounding problem, which he traces back to our scientism and disenchanted view of the world, which leads us to lose sight of the idea that to the virtuous individual, the experience they have may be directly reason giving without the need for grounding by for example seeing that this would be cruel, and so not doing it, where this is the result of a form of upbringing that McDowell identifies two other roles for it to fulfill. First, it is important because the innate endowment of human beings must put limits on the shapings of second nature that are possible for them (McDowell 1996: 190) ; that is, there are naturally defined limits to our capacities for reflection and enculturation that the processes of second nature can take. Second, from within the reflection of the virtuous agent, considerations of first nature related to flourishing will be the sort of thing that they will take into account when seeking some reassurance regarding whether the practices and norms that have shaped their ethical sensibility are ultimately a good thing. This is not because they are wondering whether, qua individuals, they should adopt those practices (that is the grounding issue again), but rather, whether we as a group have done well to adopt them, given what our flourishing consists in:
First nature matters not only in helping to shape the space in which reflection must take place, but also in that first-natural facts can be part of what reflection takes into account. This is where we can register the relevance of what human beings need in order to do well, in a sense of doing well that is not just Aristotle s acting in accordance with the virtues . Consider a rational wolf whose acquisition of practical reason included being initiated into a tradition in which co-operative behaviour in the hunt is regarded as admirable, and so as worth going in for in its own right. What wolves need might figure in a bit of reflection that might help reassure him that when he acquired a second nature with that shape, his eyes were opened to real reasons for acting. The reflection would be Neurathian, so it would not weigh with a wolf who has never acquired such a mode of valuation of conduct, or one who has come unstuck from it. And there would be no irrationality in thus failing to be convinced. But this need not undermine the reassurance, if the reflection that yields it is self-consciously Neurathian The point stands that what members of one s species need is not guaranteed to appeal to practical reason. But the point is harmless to the genuine rationality of virtue, which is visible (of course!) only from a standpoint from which it is open to view. (McDowell 1996: 190-1) McDowell hereby argues for a second sort of naturalism that is compatible with a fundamentally Aristotelian outlook , even if Aristotle himself (McDowell thinks) did not raise these questions insofar as he is notably unconcerned to defend, against potential competitors, the way things look to the kind of person he thinks of as virtuous (McDowell 1996: 189) .
So, as I understand it McDowell s picture is as follows To the wellbrought up rational wolf (or human being), various kinds of co-operative behaviour will just seem to be what is called for in the situation, as the correct thing to do, and that will be their reason for doing it and why they act; for, in this sort of case, What directly influences the will is the valuations of actions that have come to be second nature (McDowell 1996: 191) . Nonetheless, one can still seek reassurance about this upbringing and enculturation itself: for example, one might ask whether a debunking explanation for it would be better, à la Nietzsche or Marx or some other master of suspicion . 6 And this is where claims about our nature and flourishing can come in, to provide the reassurance that these practices and their norms relate to that nature in the right way.
It is important to recognize, however, that the kind of reassurance being considered here is not the same as the kind of grounding that the lone rational wolf was seeking: as a wolf working from outside the practice of virtue, he was looking for reasons to be moral that would lead to his individual good, where an appeal to what is good for wolves in general is not going to satisfy. But in looking for reassurance concerning the practices of our own enculturation to help reassure him that when he acquired a second nature with that shape, his eyes 6 
Cf McDowell
People come unstuck from a traditional ethical outlook when reflection does break out, and they come to think, rightly or wrongly, that they have seen through the outlook s pretensions of rational cogency. If something is to be an intelligible candidate for being the way second nature should be, it must at least be intelligible that the associated outlook could seem to survive this reflective scrutiny Nietzsche would seem to have become unstuck in this way when he writes )n so far as morality condemns as morality and not with regard to the aims and objects of life, it is a specific error with regard to which one should show no sympathy, an idiosyncrasy of the degenerate which has caused an unspeakable amount of harm Nietzsche Morality as Anti-Nature p were opened to real reasons for acting this isn t what we are asking about we want to know rather that these practices are not merely distortive and corrupted ideological constructs, where seeing that that the practices are good for us as a whole, not just for the individual concerned, can help to provide us with the confidence we need. The reflective reassurance provided by the connection we might find between virtue and doing well thus operate at one remove from the subject s rational will (McDowell 1996: 191) : that is (I take it), what provides the agent in question with reasons to act still only comes from seeing the act as noble or courageous or whatever, not as conductive to well being either of the individual concerned or of group as a whole; but this latter connection can still play a role in the reflective background for a second nature that values courageous actions (McDowell 1996: 191) , where McDowell puts this idea as follows This should be seen as a case of a relation that Wittgenstein draws to our attention, between our concepts and the facts of nature that underlie them.
The concepts would not be the same if the facts of (first) nature were different, and the facts help to make it intelligible that the concepts are as they are, but this does not mean that correctness and incorrectness in the application of the concepts can be captured by requirements spelled out at the level of the underlying facts (McDowell 1996: 193 Pippin s case is undoubtedly a powerful one, on both interpretative and philosophical grounds. Nonetheless, I want to argue that it underestimates the significant perfectionist strand in (egel s thinking and thus ignores something 8 Cf Pippin Put a different much more general way the relevant image for our always already engaged conceptual and practical capacities in the German idealist tradition is legislative power, not empirical discrimination and deliberative judgment, and the force of this image of legislative power makes it difficult to integrate what McDowell says about the overall effect of Bildung that it simply opens our eyes and allows us to see the reasons that are always there whether we notice them or not with the Kantian and even Hegelian elements he has also imported 9 Cf. also Pippin 2008: 91. important in McDowell s account Put simply while for Pippin (egel s modernism means he is committed to abandoning Aristotelian naturalism altogether, I will argue that it rather means that this naturalism is transformed into a type of post-Kantian perfectionism, which is a perfectionism nonetheless.
Hegel s Logic of Value
When asserting that the developmental direction of (egel s system is away from nature and towards spirit Geist , Pippin cites the relative insignificance of (egel s Philosophy of Nature to the rest of his system. As anyone who has slogged through it knows, there is a lot there that seems to turn no other wheel elsewhere in what Hegel says, and very little in the Philosophy of Spirit seems to depend on it or refer back to it (Pippin 2002: 60) .
Some might question whether this does proper justice to the joys of the
Philosophy of Nature. But more importantly for our purposes, Pippin doesn t mention the Logic here, where it is arguable that it is in this text, rather than the Philosophy of Nature, that the best evidence for (egel s Aristotelian naturalism can be found. The relevant discussion is the crucial third book of the Logic, and in his treatment of the Concept (Begriff), Judgement, and Syllogism. Here, Hegel essentially offers a hierarchy of forms of judgement and syllogism, based on how they treat the relation between the conceptual moments of universal, particular and individual. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the judgements and syllogisms of existence respectively, where there is at best a superficial relation between individual and universal, as the latter forms an accidental property of the former e g This rose is red . Hegel then moves through other forms of judgement and syllogism, as this relation becomes more substantial, until the subject-term of the judgement deals with a natural kind, and the predicate is essential to individuals of this kind. The corresponding syllogism concerns the genus to which the individual belongs, and properties that are essential to members of that genus, e g the categorical syllogism Gaius is a man; men are mortal; therefore Gaius is mortal . Now, it is precisely at this point, when a judgement introduces reference to the kind to which the individual belongs, that Hegel brings in value and normativity Thus what (egel calls the judgement of the concept Begriff are exemplifies the universal that constitutes its nature, e.g. This house, lacking a roof is bad . So, while at the simplest and most basic level, judgements and syllogisms involve claims about individuals and their simple properties, Hegel holds that it is not possible to rest at merely this level of judgement and syllogism. Rather, it is necessary to bring in more sophisticated forms of thought, involving more complex conceptual structures, to make sense of the world. In particular, it is necessary to thinking of some individual objects as instantiating natural kinds which characterize their essential natures, where this introduces a significant evaluative element. For, to understand a concept as representing a natural kind is to understand individuals falling under that kind in terms of certain characteristics; failing to possess those characteristics is then a fault in the individual qua member of the kind. So, for example, a rose that dies prematurely, or which fails to attract sufficient bees to be pollinated, or is odourless but belongs to a species with a scent is a bad rose. The subject of the apodictic judgement the house as so and so constituted is good the action as so and so constituted, is right includes first, the universal, or what it ought to be, second, its constitution; the latter contains the ground why a predicate of the judgement of the concept does or does not pertain to it, that is, According to the Logic, it appears, evaluative judgements only make sense by bringing in a consideration of what it is to be a properly functioning member of a kind, which realizes itself in this way. Now, it is this aspect of (egel s thought that then seems to resonate with the neo-Aristotelianism of writers such as Foot and Thompson. 11 For, Foot and Thompson have argued that this is the best way to understand the operation of normativity in Aristotle as well. Thus, for example, Foot writes: N atural goodness , as I define it, which is attributable only to living things themselves and to their parts, characteristics, and operations, is intrinsic or autonomous goodness in that it depends directly on the relation of an individual to the life form of its species Thus evaluation of an individual living thing in its own right, with no reference to our interests or desires, is possible where there is intersection of two types of propositions: on the one hand, Aristotelian categorials (life-form descriptions relating to the species), and on the other, propositions about particular individuals that are the subjects of evaluations. 12 So, it would appear, on this account as well as (egel s a proper use of concepts in Foot s terms Aristotelian categorials --must involve an implicit normativity, as it requires thinking of things as members of natural kinds and this itself requires thinking of them as good or bad exemplars of their kinds, in a way that appears to be fundamentally Aristotelian.
Hegel, McDowell, Pippin
So where does this brief investigation into (egel s account of normativity and value leave us in the debate between McDowell and Pippin? On the face of it, it suggests that for Hegel a kind of Aristotelian naturalism is inescapable. This is not the first kind of naturalism that McDowell rejects, whereby an appeal to the kind is used to ground ethics, as a way of persuading the non-moral agent to be whether the subject corresponds to its concept or not. This judgment is now truly objective; or it is the truth of the judgment in general. Fido is better qua dog than Rex because Fido has four legs not just three, is able to run better as a result, is therefore more likely to breed successfully, and so on.
This judgment makes sense in terms of the natural endowments of dogs, i.e. what they are characteristically given by nature. But for us (Pippin can rightly argue) it is very different maybe nature gives us all sort of things, but whether our life goes well or badly is largely independent of that, so a very different kind of normativity is involved unrelated to our species being or natural life form.
So if ) am missing a finger or a leg or can t run fast or mate successfully, it is not clear that this marks me as bad or failing to flourish in any sense; only a misplaced biologism could make it seem otherwise. Precisely because (as Pippin argues spirit is largely free of nature, this kind of claim is inappropriate for us. Thus, while there may be such a thing as the good life for dogs or beavers or cows based on their natural endowments and proper functioning , there is no such thing in our case. We are in the realm of spirit and not nature; our norms must be self-legislated rather than read off our being in the world.
However, while this worry marks an important difference between us and other natural beings, it is not clear how much it ultimately matters from the perspective of reading Hegel as a perfectionist and as a kind of naturalist. For, it could still be argued that while (egel doesn t take our essential properties to all be those that would be identified in purely biological terms, 13 he still thinks there are such essential properties, which can ground the normative claims he wants to make. In this respect, it is useful to compare the categories of human being and of person : while one can think of the former in purely biological terms, associated with various sort of biological functioning, the latter is a different notion that brings in a different conception of proper functioning and thus normativity, while equally characterizing me as a substance universal. Thus, while the category of person may not be a natural kind in the biological sense (it is not needed as part of biological taxonomy), it is still a natural kind in the philosophical sense, out of which a related kind of normativity can be built, qua good or bad exemplifications of personhood. In this way, our fundamental difference from animals can be marked. For them normativity only operates at the level of their natural kind, while for us the logical structure of normative claims as based on the essential nature of the individual can still be maintained. Now, I would like to suggest, something very close to this structure can be found in (egel s treatment of normativity in his Philosophy of Right, where the key starting point is his characterization of our nature as that of free rational agents, which in turn leads him to the will, and what it is to be an agent with a will that is properly structured (cf. PR § §5-7). 14 Now this of course doesn t fit any purely biological taxonomy. Nonetheless this doesn t mean that (egel is denying that for us as agents rather than as merely human beings biologically conceived, there is a good and bad way for us to be, particularly concerning the structure of our wills. Indeed Hegel argues that the structure of the will should involve a characteristic kind of unity of different elements that is a commonplace of the perfectionist tradition. 15 To see how this approach is compatible with an essentially Aristotelian outlook, compare it with )rwin s schematic presentation of Aristotle s view 13 Cf. Rand forthcoming. 14 Cf. PR § §5-7. 15 For further discussion, see Stern 2015.
( and malleable notion of the human good: Historicized naturalism has no general conception of the human good, but for any infant it will be born into a determinate social and historical situation, inheriting from its culture a determinate human self-understanding so that as a result h istoricized naturalism tells us to choose the childrearing practices that will actualize the self of the newborn child on that understanding Wood 33-34, my emphasis).
(owever ) would not be prepared to go even that far in a concession to (egel s supposed historicism. For, it seems to me that while it is right that for Hegel, selfactualization may occur equally well within different social practices in different societies at levels below those outlined in the Philosophy of Right, it is still the case that the fundamental structure of the will that is presented in the Introduction to that text is the same and fixed, as are the fundamental social structures which Hegel takes to realize that will; they are therefore not warranted merely as the form of institutional structure that best fit the conception of our nature prevalent at that historical period. I find no suggestion here that (egel s naturalism is an historicized one in Wood s sense ) would argue instead that the importance of history for Hegel lies in helping us to see how this form of self-understanding has been developed, and thus how this distinctively modern conception of the will as a balance of universal particular and individual moments has emerged but this is to make history the ratio cognoscendi not the ratio essendi of what it is to be a free rational agent. Moreover, taken in this way, one can also make sense of the fundamental Hegelian thought that the history of a certain sort of philosophical project might be treated as having reached an end in the modern period as this conception of agency has finally come into view, which enables us to properly reflect on our ethical and social practices in the way that The Philosophy of Right tries to do.
Conclusion
One way to focus the issues that I have been addressing is to consider the following passage from a review of one of Pippin s works by Wayne Martin
We can now see the outlines of a difficulty for Pippin s (egel Extrapolate to a community of Hegelian anorexics, each identifying profoundly with their acts of self-starvation, and finding recognition and validation from others in their community. The practice of giving and asking for reasons operates within such a community, and anorexic reasons are recognized as genuine reasons relative to the distinctive values that structure this particular local world. Members of the community risk their lives, to be sure, but they do so in pursuing something that they value above mere biological existence. To round out the Hegelian picture we can add in a reflective apologist, constructing just-so historical narratives that celebrate the anorexic commitment to break the power of natural inclination --finding therein the culmination of mankind s emergence from its merely animal nature. Does the Hegelian have to concede that anorexia has here become a paradigm of modern free agency? (Martin 2010: 290) Martin brings out nicely, ) think how in an attempt to leave nature behind Pippin arguably goes too far and fails to see how there is still space in (egel s account for a basis for normativity in the conditions for flourishing rational agency itself, not just in the kind of dialectical historical narrative that we may be able to tell about our practices. In this way, it could be argued, we properly respect the way in which Hegel harnessed the insights not only of the moderns, but of the ancients too. 17
